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INTRODUCTION
[1]
After over thirty data breaches spanning the third and fourth
quarter of 2012, Forbes magazine labeled the summer of 2012 as “The
Summer of the Data Breach.”1 Four years later, businesses across multiple
industries have suffered brand-image damage and paid millions of dollars
in remedial expenses; we are living in the era of the mega breach.2 In
2014, companies such as Target, Home Depot, JP Morgan Chase, Anthem,
Sony, UPS, Jimmy John’s, Kmart, Neiman Marcus, Community Health
Systems, and the White House suffered data breaches.3 The Home Depot
*J.D., Assistant Professor of Business Law, Butler University.
**M.B.A., Instructor of Management Information Systems, Butler University.
***Ph.D., Instructor of Business Ethics, Butler University.
1

See Dave Lewis, Notes from RSA: Accountability in Security, FORBES, (Apr. 29, 2015,
6:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davelewis/2015/04/29/notes-from-rsaaccountability-in-security/#47e46e292163, archived at https://perma.cc/HV4B-D7T8.
2

See Bill Hardekopf, The Big Data Breaches of 2014, FORBES, (Jan. 13, 2015, 7:06 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2015/01/13/the-big-data-breaches-of2014/#4ad6aa5f3a48, archived at https://perma.cc/WYT4-8JX8.
3

See id.; see Ellen Nakashima, Hackers Breach Some White House Computers, WASH.
POST (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hackers-
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breach alone resulted in the loss of “56 million credit card accounts,” “53
million email addresses,” and an estimated 63 million dollars in damage.4
In addition to the economic fallout associated with data breaches, the 2015
Ashley Madison data breach highlighted the personal toll faced by
consumers when their “private” information becomes “public.”5 That data
breach exposed the identities of millions of would-be philanderers,
shaming not only the subscribers to Ashley Madison’s service, but also
innocent bystanders such as their family members.6 The frequency of data
breaches has shown no signs of abating in 2016—in the first quarter,
multiple hospitals fell victim to “ransomware,” a data breach that allows
hackers to literally hold patient data hostage.7 Several hospitals had to pay
hackers to regain access to their patients’ data.8
[2]
“Decentralized technology” creates a different set of problems than
the simple misuse of a single individual’s “technological profile” and
information.9 Today, unauthorized access to electronic information, a
result of what Burnham in 1983 referred to as “transactional
information,”10 includes “hackers breaking into systems or networks, third
breach-some-white-house-computers/2014/10/28/2ddf2fa0-5ef7-11e4-91f75d89b5e8c251_story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/HD4S-MUX2.
4

The Home Depot, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 25, 2015), at 18–19.

5

See Eric Basu, Cybersecurity Lessons Learned from the Ashley Madison Hack, FORBES,
(Oct. 26, 2015, 11:55 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericbasu/2015/10/26/cybersecurity-lessons-learned-fromthe-ashley-madison-hack/#14c58a7eed99, archived at https://perma.cc/U4L3-R6VE.
6

See id.

7

See Seung Lee, Ransomware Wreaking Havoc in American and Canadian Hospitals,
NEWSWEEK, (Mar. 23, 2016, 10:23 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/ransomwarewreaking-havoc-american-and-canadian-hospitals-439714, archived at
https://perma.cc/MJ2N-UW4T.
8

See id.

9

See Mary J. Culnan & Cynthia Clark Williams, How Ethics Can Enhance
Organizational Privacy: Lessons From the ChoicePoint and TJX Data Breaches, 33 MIS
Q. 673, 673 (2009).
10

DAVID BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER STATE 50 (1983).
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parties accessing personal information on lost laptops or other mobile
devices, or organizations failing to dispose of personal information
securely.”11 Data breaches exemplify the first type of unauthorized access
and despite their frequent occurrence, they are little examined from an
ethical standpoint. Though Google Scholar lists over 82,000 entries under
“ethics of a data breach,” very few combine both terms in the title.12 One
article that does so notes a “dearth of prior organizational-level privacy
research, which has largely overlooked ethical issues or the personal
harms often caused by privacy violations.”13 Even within the field of
technology, “there has not been a huge literature on ethics within the
mainstream of information systems journals.”14 Part of the problem is the
novelty of data breach cases. They are so new and different that they
appear to be technologically, morally, and legally unlike other problems.
We suggest that analogies and analyses exist which can help resolve some
of these moral and legal puzzles.
[3]
First, this paper discusses the anatomy of a data breach, providing
technical background on the way breaches occur. Next, we identify the
ethical dimensions of data breaches. While privacy is a key topic in any
ethical analysis of a data breach, other issues are more pressing, such as
the responsibility of organizations to prevent and to repair consequences
of data breaches. Then we analyze the current status of the law with regard
to data breaches. We note immediately that the laws of various states are
exactly that, various and eclectic. No consistent and stable legal
understanding appears to have availed itself. The article concludes with
guidance regarding data breach prevention, which can help businesses
meet their ethical and legal obligations.
11

Culnan & Williams, supra note 9, at 675.

12

See Search Results for “Ethics of a Data Breach,” GOOGLE SCHOLAR,
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=ethics+of+a+data+breach&btnG=&as_sdt=
1%2C47&as_sdtp=, archived at https://perma.cc/7HZG-UK9D (last visited Sept. 20,
2016).
13

Culnan & Williams, supra note 9, at 673.

14

John Mingers & Geoff Walsham, Toward Ethical Information Systems: The
Contribution of Discourse Ethics, 34 MIS Q. 833, 837 (2010).
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I. DATA BREACH BASICS
[4]
According to popular folklore, the first computer “bug” was
officially documented in 1945.15 This was years before the first personal
computer was released, and instead of malware or social engineering
deception, the “bug” was literally a moth that was stuck between two
components of IBM’s Harvard Mark II.16 After a cataclysmic data breach
in the modern computing age, however, postmortem reports eventually
surface that provide the details of each individual breach.17 These reports
explain the hacker’s methodology, the company’s missed warning signs,
and the collateral damage from the breach.18 Each individual breach has its
own signature as every data system is as unique as a fingerprint; however,
these breaches generally occur in one of several ways.
[5]
The most common and well-documented method of cyber-attack
uses malware.19 Malware, which includes viruses, worms, and trojan
15

See Computerworld Staff, The Moth in the Machine: Debugging the Origins of the
Bug, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 3, 2011, 7:00 AM),
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2515435/app-development/moth-in-the-machine-debugging-the-origins-of--bug-.html, archived at https://perma.cc/KC3P-8QRF; see also
Fred R. Shapiro, Etymology of the Computer Bug: History and Folklore, 62 AMERICAN
SPEECH 376, 376–77 (1987).
16

See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 376–77 (noting that a moth was found in the Mark II in
1945, but contending that the word “bug” was used to describe defects in machines long
before 1945; thus, the term did not originate with the insect found in the Mark II).
17

See Pragati Verma, You’ve Been Breached -- What Now? A Post-Mortem Checklist,
FORBES: ALLCLEAR ID (Aug. 17, 2015, 11:27 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/allclearid/2015/08/17/youve-been-breached-what-now-apost-mortem-checklist/#13a42ec34384, archived at https://perma.cc/Z365-VFCT.
18

See id.

19

See RAYMOND R. PANKO & JULIA L. PANKO, BUSINESS DATA NETWORKS AND
SECURITY 91 (Pearson, 10th ed. 2015).
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horses, is the “generic name for evil software.” 20 A 2016 data breach
report by Verizon found that malware continues to be the major
contributor to data breaches involving stolen credentials and point of sale
attacks. 21 Malware attacks, specifically worms, were publically credited
for both the Target22 and Home Depot23 data breaches. Ironically, the first
worm was created in 1975 by Xerox as a network analysis tool.24 Modern
day worms are standalone programs that can replicate and spread
throughout a network when activated.25 Some of the more notable worms
include Melissa, ILOVEYOU, Slammer, and the Morris worm.26 Malware
is not the only factor that can lead to network compromise. Security
breaches often are attributable to social engineering.27

20

Id.

21

See VERIZON, INC., 2016 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT, at 20 (2016),
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/2016, archived at
https://perma.cc/E8S4-RHVU (follow “Download the 2016 DBIR”) [hereinafter
VERIZON REPORT].
22

See Keith Jarvis & Jason Milletary, Inside a Targeted Point-of-Sale Data Breach,
DELL SECUREWORKS, at 1 (Jan. 24, 2014), http://krebsonsecurity.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/Inside-a-Targeted-Point-of-Sale-Data-Breach.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/5V6Y-CAED.
23

See Hardekopf, supra note 2.

24

See Michael A. Hiltzik, Computer Viruses Can Be Healthy for Innovation, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 5, 1999), at 1, http://articles.latimes.com/1999/apr/05/business/fi-24293, archived
at https://perma.cc/A5ZD-P4R4.
25

See PANKO & PANKO, supra note 19, at 93.

26

See, e.g., Ned Potter, Top 10 Computer Viruses and Worms, ABC NEWS (Sept. 3,
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/top-computer-viruses-worms-internethistory/story?id=8480794, archived at https://perma.cc/C6DW-YT2P (listing the top 10
most well-known computer viruses and worms).
27

See VERIZON REPORT, supra note 21, at 17 (noting that most phishing cases “feature
phishing as a means to install persistent malware,” leading to security breach).
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[6]
Social engineering employs deception tactics to persuade the user
to simply give the cybercriminal direct access to the system under attack,
similar to the modus operandi of a traditional con-artist.28 Social
engineering attacks direct messages and correspondence to users who have
access to the systems that are being attacked.29 Through different methods
of deception, the user is prompted to give away the information needed to
access the system.30 The most common methods of social engineering are
spear phishing, smishing, and vishing.31 Spear phishing is direct
correspondence, usually via email, that is personally crafted to gain the
trust of the end user.32 Once trust is obtained, the user is prompted for
login credentials and the system is compromised. Smishing and vishing
are similar to spear phishing; however, they use text messages (smishing)
and voice communication (vishing) as mediums.33 It is also worth noting
that old-fashioned tactics such as breaking and entering, removing files
from the printer, or simply guessing passwords are still commonly used
tricks of the trade.34

28

See PANKO & PANKO, supra note 19, at 96–97.

29

See id. at 96.

30

See id. at 97.

31

See id. at 96–97; see FBI, Smishing and Vishing and Other Cyber Scams to Watch Out
for This Holiday, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Nov. 24, 2010),
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2010/november/cyber_112410/cyber_1124
10 [hereinafter Smishing and Vishing].
32

See PANKO & PANKO, supra note 19, at 97.

33

See Smishing and Vishing, supra note 31.

34

See, e.g., Eric Geier, Your Printer Could Be a Security Sore Spot, PC WORLD (Apr. 25,
2012, 6:01 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/254518/your_printer_could_be_a_security_sore_spot.ht
ml, archived at https://perma.cc/7PZY-87MX (discussing five security threats network
printers may impose); see also Matt Smith, The 5 Most Common Tactics Used to Hack
Passwords, MAKE USE OF (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/5-commontactics-hack-passwords/, archived at https://perma.cc/YJ4K-NDLR.
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[7]
To circumvent the millions of dollars companies invest in
information technology security, hackers often use a combination of the
tactics discussed above. As detailed in the Dell SecureWorks report on the
Target infiltration, a combination of social engineering and malware was
used to cause the collapse.35 Hackers first targeted Fazio Mechanical
Services, a vendor for Target.36 They were able to gain login credentials
through spear phishing, which in turn granted them direct access to the
systems that opened a pathway to Target’s network.37 Upon accessing
Target’s data network, the hackers injected a worm into the system.38 This
worm compromised Target’s point of sale systems using a customized
version of malware called Black POS.39 This malware then compromised
Target’s server, which allowed the data to be distributed and copied to
servers located throughout the world; accordingly, the hack was very
difficult to trace.40
[8]
For businesses, the question of data breach is not “if” but “when.”
It is indisputable that the hackers in the examples discussed above bear the
moral responsibility for their acts.41 But the moral responsibility of the
business that sustains the data breach presents a closer question.
Businesses require consumers to provide their private information when
completing even the most routine transactions; this places the business in a

35

See Jarvis & Milletary, supra note 22, at 1,10.

36

See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COM., SCI., AND TRANSP., 113TH CONG., A “KILL CHAIN”
ANALYSIS OF THE 2013 TARGET DATA BREACH 4 (2014),
http://www.public.navy.mil/spawar/Press/Documents/Publications/03.26.15_USSenate.p
df, archived at https://perma.cc/SLX8-24UD.
37

See id. at 8.

38

See id. at 9.

39

See id. at 2, 9.

40

See id. at 4.

41

See generally Richard J. McGowan & Hilary G. Buttrick, Moral Responsibility and
Legal Liability, or Ethics Drives the Law, 11 J. LEARNING IN HIGHER EDUC. 9, 10 (2015)
(discussing the three basic elements of moral responsibility).

7

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXIII, Issue 1

unique position of trust. The scope of a business’s moral responsibility for
breach of that trust is discussed below.

II. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DATA BREACH
[9]
Of course, the right to privacy is at the fore. However, information
technology “explicitly embodies particular important values…privacy,
autonomy, universal usability, trust, and cooperation.”42 The existing
literature does not explore the scope of a business’ moral responsibility for
data breach. Accordingly, reference to other areas, such as moral
responsibility for marketing, is instructive. The values associated with
information technology suggest moral analysis based on the ethics of
marketing and on notions of corporate responsibility, inasmuch as
knowledge plays a role in making autonomous choices and trust is
associated with responsibility.43
[10] Three main positions have been staked out over the years with
regard to marketing: the contractual view, the due care theory, and the
social costs view, sometimes referred to as the “deep pockets” view.44
Captured in the phrase, caveat emptor, the contractual view of the buyerseller relationship holds that the seller, typically a business, only has the
duties to the buyer that the contract states.45 Thus, under the contract view,
Ford could indeed sell a product which, when struck from behind at 21
miles per hour, could produce a flaming inferno.46
42

Mingers & Walshman, supra note 14 at 839.

43

See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 347−50 (1971) (discussing the
moral psychology and the acquisition of the sentiment of justice).
44

See MANUEL VELASQUEZ, BUSINESS ETHICS: CONCEPTS AND CASES 308 (7th ed.
2012).
45

See id. at 314; see generally THOMAS GARRETT & RICHARD KLONOSKI, BUSINESS
ETHICS 88 (2nd ed. 1986) (discussing the fairness of a sales contract and the importance
of protecting the dignity of the buyers).
46

See generally CLARK BUTLER, HUMAN RIGHTS ETHICS: A RATIONAL APPROACH 80
(2008) (discussing the moral psychology and the acquisition of the sentiment of justice).
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[11] The problem is that consumers lack the knowledge that the
producer has and therefore cannot act knowledgably in purchasing a
product. The due care position recognizes the imbalance and the
vulnerable position of the consumer by placing additional duties on the
business.47 As Culnan and Williams put the matter, “[w]e further argue
that because consumers are vulnerable in their dealings with businesses
due to information and control deficits, organizations have a moral duty—
often overlooked, we observe—that extends beyond legal compliance
requiring them to take reasonable precautions with consumer data and to
avoid harm in using this data.”48 The “deep pockets” view–analogous to
the legal notion of strict liability–would have the seller assume all costs–
even when exercising “due care” to protect the consumer from risk and
injury–of a product.49 In other words, when a problem occurs, no
investigation need be undertaken: the seller takes the responsibility, or
caveat vendor.50 Given the poor record of businesses with regard to
handling data breaches,51 the third option appears most reasonable.
[12] Corporations have been reluctant to take steps to exhibit moral
responsibility in the area of data breach.52 Normally, when wrongdoing
occurs in an organizational setting, the elements of magnitude and
47

See Edgar H. Schein, The Problem of Moral Education for the Business Manager, 8
INDUST. REV. 3, 4 (1966).
48

Culnan & Williams, supra note 9, at 674.

49

See Reed Dickerson, The Basis of Strict Products Liability, 16 FOOD, DRUG, COSMETIC
L.J. 585, 591 (1961).
50

See David A. Hall, Strict Liability and Computer Software: Caveat Vendor, 4
COMPUTER/L. J. 373, 373 (1983).
51

See generally Culnan & Williams, supra note 9, at 681−82 (discussing the ways in
which consumers are vulnerable when businesses lack appropriate data security
measures); see also Simon Petravick & Stephan G. Kerr, Protect Your Portable Data—
Always and Everywhere, 6 J. OF ACCT. 30, 31 (2009) (discussing the ways in which
businesspeople often fail to appropriately safeguard confidential client information).
52

See Culnan & Williams, supra note 9, at 681−82.
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certitude of harm as well as connection and contribution to the harm are
utilized.53 Corporations appear to underestimate magnitude and certitude
of harm and appear to ignore the contribution they make to data breaches
by being primarily reactive rather than proactive.54 While an analysis of a
business’s moral responsibility for a data breach suggests the
appropriateness of a rule akin to strict liability, the law is far from
imposing such an obligation.55
III. LEGAL LIABILITY AND DATA BREACH
[13] Not surprisingly, the development of data breach law has lagged
behind the speed of technological innovation.56 There are two significant
legal questions surrounding data breaches. First, what legal obligations
does a business owe its customers regarding data security and notifications
of a breach? Second, what legal remedies do consumers have if their
private information is compromised as the result of a data breach? As
discussed below, there is currently no comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme addressing data breach.57 Instead, businesses must attempt to
comply with a patchwork of state laws addressing data breach

53

See McGowan & Buttrick, supra note 41, at 11.

54

See Culnan & Williams, supra note 9, at 674.

55

See Norman C. Simon, Brendan M. Schulman & Samantha V. Ettari, Beware the
Breach: Data Breaches, Notification Duties, and Legal Liability, LEXOLOGY.COM (Aug.
29, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=221e63eb-ccea-4f5f-80e7b72905037a6f, archived at https://perma.cc/9FBG-KKQY.
56

See Adi Snir, Dealing with the Law Lag, LEGALVISION (May 6, 2016),
https://legalvision.com.au/dealing-with-the-law-lag/, archived at https://perma.cc/7SW74KFE.
57

See Peter J. Arant, Understanding Data Breach Liability: The Basics Every Attorney
Should Know, 40 MONT. L. 8, 8–9 (2015) (“At the federal level, there is no
comprehensive data privacy or security law. Instead the U.S. follows a ‘sectoral’
approach, meaning there are federal laws that apply to specific sectors.”).
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notifications.58 Additionally, consumers are left with few effective civil
remedies when their private information is breached.59
A. Data Breach Notification Laws
[14] At present, there is no comprehensive federal statute addressing a
business’s obligation to safeguard personal information.60 While there are
a few federal statutes aimed at protecting personal information in narrow
contexts (such as the protection of medical and health-related information
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996),61
the legal rules governing data breach are handled largely at the state
level.62 Currently, “[f]orty-seven states, [and] the District of Columbia”
58

See id.; see also Comparison of U.S. State and Federal Security Breach Notification
Laws, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (Jan. 21, 2016),
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/htmldocuments/SteptoeDataBreachNotificationChart.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/4R39-6XJQ.
59

See Rachel M. Peters, So You’ve Been Notified, Now What? The Problem with Current
Data-Breach Notification Laws, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1171, 1175 (2014) (“[O]nce an
individual has been notified of a breach, she has limited legal recourse against the
company or organization that exposed her personal information.”).
60

See Arant, supra note 57, at 8–9.

61

See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936; see Arant, supra note 57, at 9 (noting that the Federal Trade Commission
may bring lawsuits against companies with “lax security and privacy practices” because
they are considered “unfair or deceptive practices”); see also Charlotte A. Tschider,
Experimenting with Privacy: Driving Efficiency Through a State-Informed Federal Data
Breach Notification and Data Protection Law, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 45, 47,
53–54 (2015) (“Because no federal law in the United States provides a broad,
comprehensive set of data breach notification or data protection requirements for all
businesses and consumers, other federal administrative bodies have provided catch-all
protection in some circumstances.”).
62

See Jeff Kosseff, Cyberwars: Navigating Responsibilities for the Public and Private
Sector: Positive Cybersecurity Law: Creating a Consistent and Incentive-Based System,
19 CHAP. L. REV. 401, 402 (2016) (We have “a patchwork of related laws, including
breach notification and privacy statutes, that focus on penalizing companies for
inadequate data security. But our legal system lacks a coordinated network of laws that
are designed to promote cybersecurity and prevent data breaches from occurring in the
first place.”); see also Peters, supra note 59, at 1181 (discussing various state law databreach notification statutes).
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have laws addressing business obligations with regard to data breaches.63
Three states—Alabama, New Mexico, and South Dakota—have no
statutes on the books addressing consumer notification of data breaches.64
Most states impose obligations on businesses to maintain “reasonable
security” measures “to protect personal information.”65 While definitions
vary from state to state, “personal information” commonly includes an
individual’s social security number,66 or
[A]n individual's first and last names, or first initial and last
name, and one (1) or more of the following data elements
that are not encrypted or redacted: (A) A driver's license
number. (B) A state identification card number. (C) A
credit card number. (D) A financial account number or
debit card number in combination with a security code,
password, or access code that would permit access to the
person's account.67
[15] A “breach” occurs when there is an “unauthorized acquisition of
computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, or
integrity of personal information. . . .”68

63

Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/securitybreach-notification-laws.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/8JUS-CXX5 [hereinafter
NCSL Security Breach Research]
64

See id.

65

Timothy J. Toohey, Beyond Technophobia: Lawyers’ Ethical and Legal Obligations to
Monitor Evolving Technology and Security Risks, 21 J.L. & TECH. 1, 14 (2015)
(explaining general state law requirements for data breach security in context of
attorneys’ obligations to secure data).
66

See IND. CODE § 24-4.9-2-10(1) (2014).

67

IND. CODE § 24-4.9-2-10(2)(A)-(D) (2014).

68

IND. CODE § 24-4.9-2-2(a) (2014).
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[16] In the event of a data breach, existing statutes require businesses to
provide some type of notification to the consumer.69 The type and timing
of that notice, however, varies from state to state.70 Some states require
consumer notification whenever unauthorized access of personal
information occurs.71 Other states require businesses to notify consumers
only if there appears to be a reasonable risk that some harm will result
from the breach.72 Many states require businesses to notify the attorney
general of data breaches.73 Some statutes require notification within a
specified time frame, while others simply require that notification be done
expediently.74 Businesses that serve consumers in multiple states must
comply with the notification requirements of each of the states where
affected consumers reside.75 Thus, when a large data breach occurs,
businesses face a considerable challenge in ensuring compliance with the
various notification laws throughout the country.76
[17] This patchwork of state regulation leads commentators and policy
advocates to suggest that a comprehensive federal data breach statute
69

See NCSL Security Breach Research, supra note 63.

70

See Data Breach Charts, BAKER HOSTETLER 1, 17−18,
http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Data%20Breach%20documents/Dat
a_Breach_Charts.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/MM5K-ZRT3 (last visited Oct. 4,
2016) (providing state-by-state-survey of data breach notification requirements).
71

See id. at 9.

72

See id. at 9−12.

73

See id. at 13−16.

74

See id. at 15-16, 18−19.

75

See Sasha Romanosky et al., Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 11 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 74, 80 (2014) (“[I]t is the residence of the individual that drives
disclosure, not the location of the breach. That is, disclosure to an individual is required
only if the state in which the individual is a citizen has adopted a disclosure law.”).
76

See Arant, supra note 56, at 10 (“Given the heterogeneous nature of state data breach
notification laws, simultaneous compliance with multiple laws can be a logistical
nightmare—and an expensive one at that.”).
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should be enacted.77 A federal data breach statute would preempt state
regulation, thus simplifying the breaching business’s compliance
requirements and costs.78 Instead of struggling to comply with the various
notification laws of multiple states, a business would look to only one
source—federal law—to discern its obligations in the event of a data
breach.79 While federal bills have been proposed,80 Congress has failed to
pass any comprehensive proposal.81
[18] Moreover, critics claim that draft bills are weak and do not offer
enough protection for consumers.82 In particular, critics note that the
77

See Jill Joerling, Note, Data Breach Notification Laws: An Argument for a
Comprehensive Federal Law to Protect Consumer Data, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 467,
486 (2010) (“Congress should take action immediately to enact a federal data breach
notification law.”); see also Jay P. Kesan, et al., A Comprehensive Empirical Study of
Data Privacy, Trust, and Consumer Autonomy, 91 IND. L.J. 267, 346−48 (2016)
(suggesting “a complete overhaul of data privacy law[s] and the creation of [centralized]
profile repository” for consumers’ data that would operate in a fashion similar to credit
bureaus); Tschider, supra note 61, at 72 (“a federal statute should regulate all businesses
involving consumer personal information to effectively preserve customer choice and
control with respect to their information, to drive contract efficiency, and to facilitate
international trade.”).
78

See Joerling, supra note 77, at 486.

79

See id. (“Replacing the current patchwork of . . . state laws with a single
comprehensive federal law would give businesses a clear road map to follow after a
breach.”).
80

See, e.g., Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, H.R. 1770, 114th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2016) (demonstrating a proposed federal data breach law that did not pass in
Congress).
81

See Brett V. Newman, Hacking the Current System: Congress’ Attempt to Pass Data
Security and Breach Notification Legislation, 2015 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 437, 445
(2015) (“The patchwork state legislation and numerous bill introduced in Congress show
how difficult it is to agree on breach notification and data security measures. There is
likely an agreement that the United States needs a data breach law, but that does not
mean that one will be passed. The problem may also come from a surplus of
Congressional committees claiming jurisdiction and trying to tackle the issue—resulting
in too many different bills.”).
82

See Peters, supra note 59, at 1196. (Although Peters analyzes an earlier draft bill, the
Data Security & Breach Notification Act of 2013, her criticism holds true for the Data
Security Breach Notification Act of 2015.)
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proposals do not do enough to incentivize data breach prevention because
they focus on consumer notification after a breach has already occurred.83
To incentivize data breach prevention, businesses must view added
security measures as solid investments that minimize risks of loss.84 The
primary business risks associated with data breaches are loss of customer
goodwill and, of course, lawsuits from affected consumers.85 As discussed
below, data breach lawsuits are difficult to pursue. Accordingly, the threat
of consumer litigation has not played an extensive role in influencing
businesses to adopt more stringent security measures.86
B. Consumer Remedies for Data Breach
[19] Some commentators have argued that in order to meaningfully
encourage businesses to adopt better data protection measures, businesses
must view customer litigation as a serious threat.87 The threat of litigation
in this context has been largely hollow because consumers have few legal

83

See id.; see also Tschider, supra note 61, at 74−75 (emphasizing the need for a federal
law that focuses on data protection in addition to data breach notification: “Having clear
data protection standards will dramatically reduce uncertainty for consumers and
business, as standard data protection requirements will be articulated and required for
implementation . . .”); see also Andrea Peterson, Why this National Data Breach
Notification Bill has Privacy Advocates Worried, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/04/15/why-this-nationaldata-breach-notification-bill-has-privacy-advocates-worried, archived at
https://perma.cc/C9U3-S3W3 (noting that consumers could have fewer protections under
Data Security Breach Notification Act of 2015 than they have under existing state laws).
84

See Kosseff, supra note 62, at 403 (arguing that laws should create incentives through
tax credits and litigation safe harbors to encourage businesses to invest in cybersecurity
infrastructure; rather than focus solely on penalties for data breaches).
85

See PONEMON INST., 2016 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: UNITED STATES, IBM, 1, 3,
13 (2016).
86

See Peters, supra note 59, at 1193.

87

See id. at 1197 (noting that a national data breach law that gives consumers a private
right of action or requires mandatory credit monitoring “will be an incentive for
companies to minimize data breaches.”).
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remedies when their personal information is breached.88 While data breach
statutes require businesses to notify consumers in the event of a breach,
only a handful of those statutes create a private cause of action that allows
the consumer to bring a lawsuit against the business.89 Thus, in the
majority of states with data breach statutes, the consumer is statutorily
entitled to notice of the breach but little else.90 Given the lack of
meaningful statutory remedies for data breaches, consumers have looked
to the common law for a cognizable theory of recovery.91 Consumers have
sought damages for data breaches under theories of negligence, breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and infliction of emotional distress.92
These common law theories are not well-suited to data breach cases and
often end in dismissal for several reasons.93
[20] First, the harm that results from data breaches is most commonly
economic harm—there is no personal injury or physical property damage
sustained by the consumer as a result of the data breach.94 Many
88

See, e.g., Nicole Hong, For Consumers, Injury Is Hard to Prove in Data-Breach Case,
WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2016, 8:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/for-consumersinjury-is-hard-to-prove-in-data-breach-cases-1466985988, archived at
https://perma.cc/F3VF-8LKD.
89

See BAKER HOSTETLER, supra note 70, at 16–18.

90

See Kesan et al., supra note 77, at 277 (noting that “many other states merely require
companies to notify customers of data breaches and the relevant statutes do not create any
additional duties or entitlements.”).
91

See also Thomas Martecchini, A Day in Court for Data Breach Plaintiffs: Preserving
Standing Based on Increased Risk of Identity Theft After Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (noting that courts are divided on
“whether increased risk of identity theft is an injury-in-fact sufficient to create
standing…”).
92

See Peters, supra note 59, at 1185 (discussing various common law theories available
to consumers for data breach).
93

See id. at 1185−87 (“[A] principle reason that civil causes of action in data-breach
cases are rarely successful is the difficulty consumer data-breach victims have in meeting
the standing and injury requirements.”).
94

But see Kesan et al., supra note 77, at 344 (discussing the various types of harm that
result from loss of control over personal data, “including dignitary harms; a chilling
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jurisdictions follow a rule called the “economic loss doctrine,” which
prevents consumers from recovering purely economic damages under a
tort theory (such as negligence or infliction of emotional distress).95 Thus,
in jurisdictions that follow the economic loss doctrine, data breach claims
sounding in tort rarely reach the jury because they are dismissed as the
result of pretrial dispositive motions filed by the defendant.96
[21] Second, many data breach cases are dismissed because the
consumer lacks standing to bring such a claim.97 Standing is a
constitutional prerequisite to litigation that requires the plaintiff to have
suffered an injury in fact.98 In other words, the harm sustained by the
plaintiff must be real, not hypothetical or speculative.99 In data breach
cases, the injury can be hard to define. Plaintiff consumers often argue that
the data breach itself and the risk of future identity theft are sufficient
harms; defendant businesses contend that no injury has occurred unless the
plaintiff can show a link between the data breach and an actual instance of

effect from law enforcement having too much control over individual expression; and
circumstances that interfere with an individual’s ability to exercise freedoms or develop a
sense of self-determination.”).
95

See, e.g., Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 2005) (holding that
economic losses are not recoverable in a tort action premised on the failure of a product
or service to perform as expected unless the failure results in personal injury or physical
harm to property other than the product; proper remedy sounds in contract).
96

See Peters, supra note 59, at 1186 (discussing data breach cases dismissed on economic
loss grounds).
97

See id. at 1187 (discussing split of authority with regard to whether consumers have
standing to bring suit in data breach cases).
98

See, e.g., Remijas v. Nieman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 691–92 (7th Cir.
2015) (holding that standing requires a litigant to show a concrete injury that is causally
linked to the defendants conduct and can be redressed by the court).
99

See id.
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identity theft.100 Not surprisingly, the courts are divided on what type of
injury suffices to confer standing in a data breach case.101
[22] Even if the plaintiff consumer in a data breach case survives the
standing hurdle, he or she must still prove all of the elements of his or her
case in order to win. In most instances, the consumer will have to prove
that his or her injury was caused by the defendant’s data breach.102
Proving causation in data breach cases can be difficult because the
plaintiff’s personal information may have been compromised in other data
breaches, making it nearly impossible to establish that the suffered identity
theft was solely the result of the defendant’s breach.103
[23] The procedural and substantive difficulties associated with data
breach litigation mean that very few of these cases are likely to survive
dispositive motions and reach a jury, which in turn makes them less
attractive to class action attorneys.104 The procedural hurdles, the cost of
litigation, and the prospect of a small recovery are enough to deter most
individual consumers from bringing a data breach lawsuit.105 Without
100

See Peters, supra note 59, at 1189–92 (collecting cases addressing standing and injuryin-fact in context of data breach litigation).
101

See id.; see also Martecchini, supra note 91, at 1474 (noting that courts are divided on
“whether increased risk of identity theft is an injury-in-fact sufficient to create
standing…”).
102

See Michael D. Simpson, All Your Data Are Belong to Us Consumer Data Breach
Rights and Remedies in an Electronic Exchange Economy, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 669,
685–86 (2016) (discussing difficulties of applying common law tort theories to data
breach cases).
103

See Peters, supra note 59, at 1188 (“[I]f a person is the victim of two or more data
breaches in which similar personal information is stolen and that information is not used
until years later to harm her, it may be difficult for the victim to demonstrate which
breach was the source of the information used.”); see also Newman, supra note 81, at 440
(“proving that a customer lost money due to a specific breach can be difficult.”).
104

See Peters, supra note 59, at 1192–93.

105

See generally Jeff John Roberts, This Court Ruling Just Made It Easier to Sue
Companies That Get Hacked, FORTUNE (July 29, 2015, 7:00 PM),
http://fortune.com/2015/07/29/data-breach-7th-circuit/, archived at
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effective legal remedies, most consumers must simply put up with the
headaches associated with data breaches.106 While external litigation
pressures and the current data breach regulatory state may not incentivize
businesses to take additional steps to safeguard consumer privacy, ethics
would certainly suggest that businesses should voluntarily adopt higher
standards for data protection.107
IV. BUSINESS STRATEGIES TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF DATA BREACH
[24] Several tactics can help reduce the threat of cybercrime. The first
tactic is infrastructure.108 A modern company must continually perform
routine maintenance including, but not limited to, security patches,
operating system upgrades, and hardware upgrades. Often cyber criminals
exploit older software to maliciously gain access to data networks.109 The
initial discovery of these exploits before the software manufacturer has
developed a security patch is called a "zero-day attack.”110 Once a
hardware or software exploit is identified, software and hardware vendors
act to create patches to repair the problem as quickly as possible.111 It is up
to the corporation to obtain and apply these patches.
https://perma.cc/C4ZT-SQD7 (discussing the hurdles victims of data breaches face when
trying to sue).
106

See Simpson, supra note 102, at 698 (observing that “the average consumer is
essentially at the mercy of a breached entity’s largesse to gain any recompense for stolen
data.”).
107

See supra Part II; see also Martecchini, supra note 91, at 1473 (noting that while
many businesses are implementing data protection plans, “many other businesses still
remain in denial about the threat of data breaches, either failing to implement any datasecurity changes or making only nominal modifications.”).
108

See Pierluigi Paganini, Preventing and Recovering From Cybercrime, TRIPWIRE (Nov.
4, 2014), http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/incident-detection/preventing-andrecovering-from-cybercrime/, archived at https://perma.cc/PYB7-VKN5.
109

See PANKO & PANKO, supra note 19, at 92.

110

See id.

111

See id.
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[25] The second prevention method is active monitoring.112 Similar to
the way that the FBI manages the national threat level, a company’s IT
department must manage the cybercrime threat level.113 Myriad firewall
and IT monitoring software is available to monitor network traffic.114
Many anti-virus software programs automatically scan and remove
commonly found malware.115 In addition, IT security companies provide
external monitoring services to augment a company’s internal monitoring
procedures.116 These offsite IT services offer network traffic monitoring
and even provide built-in client insurance/reimbursement if a data breach
occurs due to negligence within their services.
[26] The third prevention method is education.117 While most people
envision a hacker in a dark basement surrounded by computers, social
engineering is a remarkably effective method of data intrusion.118 For
example, a study of data breaches occurring in 2015 found that “30% of
phishing messages were opened by the target across all campaigns.”119
The risk of data breach can be mitigated if employees know they should
never share passwords; they should frequently change passwords, and they

112

See Paganini, supra note 108.

113

See DC Metro Cyber Security Summit, THE CYBERWIRE (June 3, 2015),
https://www.thecyberwire.com/events/dc-metro-cyber-security-summit-2015.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/Z4XN-M6NK.
114

See, e.g., PANKO & PANKO, supra note 19, at 116–23 (discussing various forms of
firewalls, their strengths, and their weaknesses).
115

See id. at 124.

116

See, e.g., Third Party Monitoring - Vendor Monitoring, OBSERVEIT,
http://www.observeit.com/solutions/third-party-monitoring, archived at
https://perma.cc/P3SX-SW4W (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (illustrating the monitoring
services that a third party security company provides).
117

See Paganini, supra note 108.

118

See VERIZON REPORT, supra note 21, at 17.

119

Id. at 18.
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should lock their office doors.120 Additional security measures such as key
fobs, biometric readers, and similar devices that must remain with
employees, should also be kept private. While no one strategy can
guarantee that a business will not sustain a data breach, the preceding
measures will lessen the risk.
V. CONCLUSION
[27] Though data breaches are a relatively new phenomena, guidance
about the technology, morality, and legality of data breaches is available.
If we are correct, corporations must do a better job of determining where
data breaches are likely to occur, whether from human error or
informational system flaw. Corporations must take steps to minimize risk
before data breaches occur. Protocols must be put in place that assume
responsibility for the consumers’ negative consequences, such as notifying
them immediately and providing help in diminishing the harm from the
data breach. The legal liability will be mitigated; trust and cooperation will
more likely flourish.

120

See generally JERRY FITZGERALD, ALAN DENNIS & ALEXANDRA DURCIKOVA,
BUSINESS DATA COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING 362 (11th ed. 2012) (noting that
security policies should explain to employees how to control the risk of intrusion).
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